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Logically, nothing is a universal: “Nothing is permanent” is equivalent to 
“Everything is non-permanent”. This raises the question whether there is a 
logic of nothing that escapes the universal and remains on the side of incom-
pleteness. The question has an important link with psychoanalysis, at least 
since Lacan, because of its centrality to the topic of sexuality, and female 
sexuality in particular. 
The logic of the nothing that is non-universalizable is precisely the logic 
of Lacan’s “pas-tout”, which Lacan explores principally in Seminar XX, Encore 
(1972–1973) and in “Étourdit” (1973) in the form of the four formulas of 
sexuation.1
(∃x)~Φx ~(∃x)~Φx
(∀x)Φx ~(∀x)Φx
The pas-tout is expressed by the formula on the lower right-hand side, 
~(∀x)Φx. As is well known, the pas-tout corresponds to the negative particular 
statement of Aristotelian logic, variously expressed as “Some As are non-B”, 
“Not all As are B”, or “Not every A is B”, all of which are logically equiva-
lent. It also, in some way, corresponds to the formula of predicate calculus, 
~(∀x)(Gx -> Hx).
The difference between Lacan’s formulas and the formulas of the predi-
cate calculus, below,
Lacan’s formulas Predicate calculus
(∀x)Φx (∀x)(Gx -> Hx)
(∃x)Φx (∃x)(Gx & Hx)
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1 On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Norton, New York 1975; 
“L’Étourdit”, Scilicet, Paris, no. 4 (1973), pp. 5–52. I have changed the symbols to ones 
easier to print; this alters nothing since the formal relations between the expressions re-
main the same.
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is that in Lacan’s formulas the variable, x, ranges over only those things that 
fall under Φ (i.e. speaking beings), whereas the formulas of the predicate 
calculus are formulated in such a way that the variables, x, y, z, etc., range 
over everything.
“Pas-tout” in English
I shall take Lacan’s own approach at face value and address the pas-tout as a 
conceptual or logical category, without assuming any direct link with sexuality. 
While it is true that Lacan introduces “pas-tout” in reference to female sexuality, 
it is not used only with that reference in mind. The pas-tout is a logical category, 
invented by Lacan, that is best taken as a formulation of a non-universalizable 
nothing. If we do this then we see, first, that the pas-tout, and thus the formulas 
of sexuation in general, have no intrinsic link with the field of sexuality but 
are independent of it. This is the radical novelty of the approach; the formulas 
tell us something about the nature of sexuality precisely because they do not 
attempt to say what sexuality is. This is why, and this is the second point, they 
can legitimately be applied to different fields. There are numerous examples 
of this: see, for instance, the use to which Jean-Claude Milner puts it in L’Amour 
de la langue and Les penchants criminels de l’Europe démocratique, where his use of 
the pas-tout is central to a study of the incompleteness of language, on the one 
hand, and of social organization on the other.2
Given the importance of the logic of the pas-tout, it becomes imperative to 
examine this logic in and for itself, and this is what I propose to do here. This 
is not such an easy task, because the logic is not conventional and because, as 
Alain Badiou points out, it gives the appearance of being rather confused.
First, though, some comment is called for on the actual term itself, “pas-
tout”, for which I retain the French because not only is it frequently mistrans-
lated into English but also there is an underlying ambiguity in the term in 
French which is exploited by Lacan but which cannot be retained in English. 
The term is sometimes translated into English as “not-all”, this being the most 
obvious rendering, as is the case in Television.3 Most of the commentaries do 
the same. The respected translator Bruce Fink, in his rendition of Seminar 
XX, prefers “not-whole”, while some authors alternate between the two, often 
2 L’Amour de la langue, Seuil, Paris 1978; Les penchants criminels de l’Europe démocratique, 
Verdier, Paris 2003.
3 J. Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, Norton, New York 
1990, p. 40.
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without explanation. And, as if this weren’t enough confusion, a rendering 
that retains the Aristotelian link ought to encompass “not every”, given the 
negative particular that has the form of “Not every A is B”. 
While I agree with Fink that his choice most accurately captures Lacan’s 
use of the term, I don’t believe that he sufficiently justifies it when he says that 
in speaking in terms of “quanteurs” rather than “quantificateurs”, or quantifiers, 
Lacan is indicating that his concern is not with quantity or quantification.4 In 
The Lacanian Subject Fink renders “pas-tout” as “not the whole of” or “not all 
of”, which he justifies on the same grounds – we are not dealing with quanti-
fiers but with something different. Yes, I agree that Lacan is saying something 
different – and I will explain just what this is – but I also think the reference 
to quantification theory as well should not be neglected.
Thus what is not explained by saying that “quanteurs” are not quantifiers is 
this: if we are not dealing with quantification, then what are we dealing with? 
Also, the link to Aristotelian logic and its treatment of quantification, which is 
explicitly made by Lacan, becomes mysterious, as is the point that we are first and 
foremost dealing with a logical issue and only secondarily with one of sexuation. 
It would appear then that the issue of translation cannot be solved simply 
by adopting “not-all”, or indeed by adopting any other single term or phrase, 
as the English equivalent. This is a difficulty that is further compounded by 
the fact that the entire series of English terms dealing with quantification 
– “all”, “each”, “some”, “any”, “no”, etc. – behave in slightly but significantly 
different ways from the corresponding French terms – “tout”, “tous”, “chaque”, 
“aucun”, “nul”, “quelque”, “quelques”. 
Furthermore, I think Lacan uses the terms “pas-tout” in both the partitive 
(“Not all of x is Φ.”) and distributive (“No x is Φ”) senses. This has been a 
source of confusion for English-language readers because while “pas-tout” can 
be used in both senses in French, there has never been any proper explana-
tion of why no single term in English will do. So much for the issues of transla-
tion. Let us now move on to a more substantive question.
Badiou’s critique of the pas-tout
Alain Badiou is critical of Lacan’s theory of the pas-tout on two counts.5 
He argues that Lacan is confused over his use of mathematics and logic and 
he accuses him of being “pre-Cantorian” in his conception of the infinite. 
4 Ibid., 13 & 72.
5 See his “Sujet et Infini”, in: Conditions, Seuil, Paris 1992, pp. 287–305.
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The first critique arises out of his criticism of the manner in which Lacan 
justifies the lack of logical equivalence, affirmed by both Aristotelian logic 
and modern predicate calculus, between “~(∀x)Φx” and “(∃x)~Φx”. Now, 
as Badiou points out, since castration, Φ, is supposedly universal, there can 
be no x whose access to jouissance assumes that not Φx, that is, it has to be 
false that (∃x)~Φx. How, then, does the Lacanian ~(∀x)Φx avoid the logical 
implication that (∃x)~Φx? Lacan’s explanation of how, quoted by Badiou, is 
set out in this lengthy passage.
In [Aristotelian] logic, on the basis of the fact that one can write ‘not-
every (pas-tout) x is inscribed in Φx,’ one deduces by way of implication 
that there is an x that contradicts it. But that is true on one sole con-
dition, which is that, in the whole (tout) or the not-whole (pas-tout) in 
question, we are dealing with the finite. Regarding that which is finite, 
there is not simply an implication but a strict equivalence. It is enough 
for there to be one that contradicts the universalizing formula for us 
to abolish that formula and transform it into a particular. This pas-tout 
becomes the equivalent of that which, in Aristotelian logic, is enunci-
ated on the basis of the particular. There is an exception. But we could, 
on the contrary, be dealing with the infinite. Then it is no longer from 
the perspective of extension that we must take up the pas-toute. When I 
say that woman is pas-toute and that that is why I cannot say Woman, it is 
precisely because I raise the question (je mets en question) of a jouissance 
that, with respect to everything that can be used in the function Φx, is 
in the realm of the infinite.
Now, as soon as you are dealing with an infinite set, you cannot posit 
that the pas-tout implies the existence of something that is produced 
on the basis of a negation or contradiction. You can, at a pinch, posit it 
as an indeterminate existence. But, as we know from the extension of 
mathematical logic which is qualified as intuitionist, to posit a ‘there 
exists,’ one must also be able to construct it, that is, know how to find 
where that existence is.6
Badiou’s criticism of Lacan is that his solution to this problem adopts 
two inconsistent lines of argument which he confuses. Following the first 
line, Lacan argues that the underlying logic is not classical but a variant of 
6 On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, pp. 102–03. Translation slightly 
modified.
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intuitionist logic. The second appeals to Cantor’s set theory and introduces 
what Lacan describes elsewhere as the “abyss” of the actual, or completed, 
infinite. The immediate and obvious objection is that he appeals both to 
intuitionism, which rejects the actual infinite, and to Cantor whose work 
presupposes it. 
I grant that Lacan is grasping, sometimes tentatively, for some way of 
formulating in logic something about the pas-tout and its essential incom-
pleteness, and that this has to do with the infinite. But Badiou illegitimately 
attributes a Cantorian conception of the infinite, the actual infinite, to Lacan 
in his treatment of the logic of the pas-tout at this point. The logic of the pas-
tout has to do with the infinite; Lacan says as much. But it is unwarranted to 
ascribe to him the view that this infinite is actual; in fact, the whole point is 
that the pas-tout can only function with an indeterminate or incompletable 
series, not an actual infinite one. 
Badiou points out that there is something else going on in the above 
passage, however, and that this apparent “contradiction” (which is in fact 
not one, as I have just pointed out) can be resolved. He correctly emphasizes 
Lacan’s point that ~(∀x)Φx is not to be taken “in extension”. What Lacan 
means here can be explained with the help of a mundane example. “Apples 
are not all red” can mean i/ not every apple is red, or ii/ no apple is com-
pletely red. The first meaning is the interpretation “in extension” and implies 
that some apples are not red, or (∃x)~Φx. On the other hand, the second, 
ii/, does not imply that there are non-red apples, that (∃x)~Φx, but only that 
no apple is entirely red, that is, that there is at least one x that does not come 
entirely under Φ. This is the sense in which Lacan’s ~(∀x)Φx is to be taken: 
no woman comes entirely under the phallic function. Badiou glosses this by 
saying, a little obscurely, that not all x “support” the Φ from the position of 
all, and that the formula thus indicates a “breaching” of the Φ function. 
The essential logical point is that henceforth one cannot deduce a ne-
gative existential affirmation from the (apparent) negation of the uni-
versal in the form of the pas-tout. It is not true that ‘(∃x)~Φx’ follows 
from ‘~(∀x)Φx’.7
So far so good. But Badiou is unhappy with Lacan’s appeal to intuition-
ism. In pure logic, Badiou says, intuitionism amounts to a limitation of the 
powers of negation. It rejects
7 “Sujet et Infini”, p. 291.
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– the principle of the excluded middle, i.e., that either p or ~p; 
– the equivalence between a double negation and affirmation, i.e., that ~~p 
is equivalent to p; and 
– that the negation of a universal, ~(∀x)Φx, is equivalent to the affirmation 
of a negative existential, (∃x)~Φx. In this respect, “intuitionism coincides 
perfectly with Lacan’s wish”.8 
And why is it such a crime to be an intuitionist? Badiou considers that the 
fundamental reason intuitionists reject the above principles is their Canute-
like reluctance to accept one of the most magnificent achievements of mod-
ern mathematics, the actual infinite, which they consider to be the effect 
of an uncontrolled and not clearly conceptualized negation of the finite. 
Intuitionists also reject the reductio argument, a form of reasoning where to 
prove that p one assumes that ~p and then demonstrates that this leads to a 
contradiction; ~ ~p, therefore p. Of course, refusing to accept that a double 
negation is equivalent to an affirmative entails the abandonment of reductio 
arguments, but this is not the main reason for rejecting that a double nega-
tion is equivalent to an affirmative. The main reason is that the intuitionist 
wants to reject the reductio argument because, being an indirect proof, it does 
not offer a direct proof of p, but merely proceeds by way of demonstrating 
that something else is false.
Badiou also argues that Lacan is otherwise unsympathetic to the intui-
tionist program, since elsewhere he has no objection to using a reductio argu-
ment, and, moreover, he explicitly appeals to the existence of an actual infi-
nite, which can only be proved by means of techniques rejected by intuition-
ists. This leads him to conclude that the appeal to intuitionist logic in Encore 
is opportunistic, since he is happy to appeal to it in support of his argument, 
but is otherwise unwilling to comply with the intuitionist’s austere program.
Response to Badiou
My response will consist of showing that Lacan can both be intuitionist 
about mathematics – or rather, not so much intuitionist as “constructivist” 
– and dump intuitionism as too “restrictive” as concerns logic.
Badiou is a little too hasty in his rejection of intuitionism. And he is thus 
a little too hasty in his criticism of Lacan. Badiou is a realist about mathemat-
ics and, while the extent and nature of his realism is a complex issue because 
8 Ibid., p. 291.
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he cannot be described as a straightforward Platonist about mathematical 
objects, his opposition to intuitionism is clear, categorical and constant.9 It 
is his realism, along with his conviction that set-theory is ontology, that leads 
him to so strongly oppose intuitionism, designed as it is to perniciously limit 
one to a pre-Cantorian universe. 
I would like to show why the rejection of all things intuitionist is quite 
possibly a mistake. First, it is possible to go intuitionist about mathematics but 
be quite conventional about logic, as more than one philosopher has done. 
Quine, for instance, claims:
One can practice and even preach a very considerable degree of con-
structivism without adopting intuitionist logic. Weyl’s constructive set 
theory is nearly as old as Brouwer’s intuitionism, and it uses orthodox 
logic; it goes constructivist only in its axioms of existence of sets …. Con-
structivist scruples can be reconciled with the convenience and beauty 
of classical logic.10
Why one would want to adopt this line is that there are competing con-
structions of set-theory, but not, or not so obviously, of classical logic, and 
so it would be nice to be able to see set theory as a construction without the 
consequences of doing so filtering all the way down into logic itself. What 
this does is make it apparent that Badiou’s anti-intuitionist stance is a little 
misplaced, since, I suggest, Badiou’s real debate is actually with constructivist 
views of mathematics, and this is a philosophical rather than a mathematical 
debate. Thus both Badiou and the constructivist can agree on the existence 
of an actual infinite, and disagree over the nature, not just of the actual infi-
nite, but of all mathematical objects. 
Note that Quine’s “constructivism” is not acceptable to the intuition-
ist (any more than it is to Badiou, for that matter) because the intuitionist, 
for whom mathematics is more fundamental than logic, considers that one 
would be rejecting what is primary and retaining what is secondary. In any 
case, the consequence of cleaving logical intuitionism off from mathemati-
cal “constructivism” is of course that the logical operations Badiou refers to 
as being unacceptable to the intuitionist – the law of the excluded middle, 
etc – need not be abandoned by the mathematical constructivist: one can 
9 He declares his Platonism in “Platonisme en mathématiques”, Court traité d’ontologie 
transitoire, Seuil, Paris 1998, pp. 95–109. On Badiou’s anti-intuitionism and his realism, see 
the sensitive and informed treatment by Oliver Feltham, Of Ontology, Praxis and Functional 
Work, PhD, Deakin University 2000, spec. pp. 108–15.
10 W. V. O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970, p. 88.
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be constructivist about mathematical objects even as one adheres to classical 
logic. This then leaves Lacan free both to accept these principles and, on other 
grounds, to abandon the logical equivalence
~(∀x)Φx ←→ (∃x)~Φx
The intuitionists were historically motivated by their opposition to 
Cantor, it is true, but there are other grounds for being anti-Platonist, or 
for being “constructivist”, about mathematics. Crispin Wright’s work on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is outstanding in this regard.11 
There is also Michael Dummett who reasons that the realist about mathemat-
ics operates with a notion of truth and falsity for mathematical statements 
that is independent of our means for recognizing their truth value.12 The 
realist view makes the intuitively compelling assumption that, say, Goldbach’s 
conjecture, which asserts that every even number larger than two is the sum 
of two primes, is either true or false; and this is so whether it can be proved or 
not. This is what is intuitively compelling about the Platonist position: there is 
a fact of the matter independent of whether we have demonstrated it, and the 
mathematical proof is like a discovery of something that is already there. If 
Goldbach’s Conjecture is true but cannot be proved, or has not been proved, 
then it follows that there is a mathematical reality independent of our capac-
ity to know it. Now, Dummett claims that the assumption that what makes a 
mathematical proposition true is some mathematical fact or state of affairs to 
which it corresponds is false. As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to think of 
many true sentences for which there is nothing by virtue of which they are 
true. Consider the sentence: “There will never be another Napoleon”, which 
no fact makes true. If this is so, then there are no grounds simply to assume 
that what makes a mathematical statement true is a mathematical state of af-
fairs; it would be wrong just to assume that mathematical realism is true.
What the above discussion implies is that on reflection we can draw a dis-
tinction between intuitionism and constructivism, and contrast realism not 
with intuitionism but with constructivism. It is now more apparent that Lacan 
should be considered a constructivist, and to maintain that when in Encore he 
appeals to intuitionism, whereas elsewhere he demonstrates a rejection of its 
11 Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Duckworth, London 
1980; see also his Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen University Press, 
Aberdeen 1983.
12 See his “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, in: Truth and Other Enigmas, 
Duckworth, London 1978; and Elements of Intuitionism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1977.
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methodological strictures, it is because he is a constructivist about mathemat-
ics and not intuitionist about logic. 
Badiou quotes Lacan saying, “Mathematical formalization is our goal, 
our ideal”,13 as evidence for the view that Lacan is not intuitionist; but if what 
I am saying is correct, it is evidence that Lacan is constructivist – this, I think, 
could be the only reason for such a remark – that is, Lacan can remain con-
structivist about mathematics while still not embracing the “prohibitions” of 
intuitionism. 
Moreover, I think that to consider Lacan a constructivist is right on other 
grounds as well. And if I insist on this distinction between intuitionism and 
constructivism, it is because I think that Lacan is constructivist about math-
ematics, and for reasons that are importantly related to what he elaborates 
concerning the formulas of sexuation.
It is true that Lacan commits himself to the view that ~(∀x)Φx does not 
imply that (∃x)~Φx, and appeals to intuitionist logic in support; that is, he 
endorses one of the “prohibitions” of intuitionism. And it has to be acknowl-
edged that in his use of the “pas-tout” Lacan thinks that intuitionism provides 
support. But this is a long cry from accepting the other strictures of intuition-
ism, as ascribed to him by Badiou.
Aristotle and the pas-tout
This brings us to what has been left out of the discussion so far and yet 
which must, somehow, be fundamental to the discussion: Aristotelian logic 
and predicate calculus. A careful analysis of the relationship of Lacan’s pas-
tout with Aristotelian logic reveals the correctness of the above interpretation 
of what Lacan means when he declares that ~(∀x)Φx is not to be taken “in 
extension”. I will now show why.
Aristotle distinguished between three forms of statement that affirm a 
predicate of a subject: the singular, the universal and the particular.14 Leaving 
the singular to one side, combining negation and affirmation with the univer-
sal and the particular produces statements of four logically different forms: 
universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular 
negative. 
13 On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, p. 119.
14 The substance of Aristotle’s logic is found in his two works, Prior Analytics and Posterior 
Analytics. The first contains the analysis of argument in the form of the syllogism, Aristotle’s 
most important contribution to logic, which is under discussion here.
62
RUSSELL GRIGG
There is no straightforward correlation between the universal and ex-
istential quantifiers of Aristotelian formal logic and the terms that express 
quantification in natural languages. This fact becomes particularly relevant 
when language refers to nothing, as we shall see, for the behaviour of natu-
ral language and the intuitions of its speakers diverge from the structure of 
formal languages. 
This contrast between the grammar of natural language and Aristotelian 
logic underlies a discussion of the particular in Aristotle in a work by Jacques 
Brunschwig that had a great impact on Lacan’s theory of the pas-tout.15 
Brunschwig argues that Aristotle came to realize that he had initially been 
misled by the workings of natural language, and that this led to an internal 
problem. Aristotle eventually devised a consistent logic, but it is one in which 
certain intuitions implicit in natural language have been disallowed, specially 
in relation to particular statements. 
The matter that caused problems for Aristotle, which Brunschwig analy-
ses, is one that the particular statement produces in natural language; name-
ly, the usual meaning of the particular leads to three mutually inconsistent 
propositions, as can be seen in the following three intuitively obvious assump-
tions:
1. The particular and the universal of opposite “quality” (i.e., where one 
is affirmative and the other negative) are contradictory. Ordinary usage thus 
treats the following as axiomatic:
All As are B ←→ ~Some As are not B
2. A particular statement is implied by its subalternant:
All As are B → Some As are B
As Brunschwig points out, ordinary usage is somewhat divided on this 
point. If I say to you that some (a lot, many) As are B, without knowing that 
all are, you could reply in either of two ways: either with the remark, “Actually, 
what you say is not wrong, because in fact all As are B”, or with the comment, 
“No, no, it’s not just some As that are B; all As are B.” My own view is that natu-
ral language is not so equivocal on this point since in the second scenario one 
could come back with the rejoinder that since all As are B, it must be the case 
a fortiori that some As are B. Now, if one accepts this, then one accepts that “All 
As are B” implies “Some As are B”.
15 “La proposition particulière et les preuves de non-concluance chez Aristote”, Cahiers 
pour l’Analyse, 10 (1969), pp. 3–26.
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3. The two particular statements imply one another. Ordinarily, the state-
ment “Some As are B” would be true in circumstances in which “Some As are 
not B” is equally true. If, for instance, I make the claim, “Some cats are black”, 
this would seem to imply that there are also cats that are non-black.
Some As are B ←→ Some As are not B
The problem with these three formal relations is that they are mutually 
inconsistent, as is easily shown. From “All As are B” it follows both (by 1) that 
it is false that some As are not B, and (by 2 and 3) that some As are not B, 
which is a contradiction. The contradiction can only be avoided by rejecting 
one of the above natural language axioms, 1, 2 or 3.
Rejecting axiom 3, the equivalence of the two particular statements, 
would produce the classical Aristotelian square of oppositions. The contra-
diction between “All As are B” and “No A is not B”, remains, as do the re-
lations of subalternation between “All As are B” and “Some As are B” and 
between “No As are B” and “Some As are not B”. The equivalence of the two 
particular statements, “Some As are B” and “Some As are not B”, becomes 
one of subcontraries, or compatibility, where both may be true together but 
not false. The particular “Some As are B” thus becomes interpreted as saying, 
“At least one A is B”, where it is not excluded that all are. Brunschwig calls 
this interpretation of “Some As are B” and “Some As are not B” where it is not 
excluded that all As are (not) B the “minimal particular”.
If on the other hand we reject axiom 2 and retain axioms 1 and 3, we ob-
tain a system in which the two particulars imply one another. If one wishes to 
maintain as contradictories “All As are B” and “Some As are not B”, and “No 
As are B” and “Some As are B”, then one is obliged to allow, paradoxically, 
both that each of the particulars is contradictory with the universal of the 
same quality and that each is still the contradictory of the universal of the 
opposite quality. In effect, both universals must contradict both particulars, 
since the latter are equivalent. And, moreover, the two universals must be 
equivalent because they are contradictories of equivalent propositions. 
The particular statement “Some As are B” becomes “At least and at most 
some As are B”, and “No As are B” becomes “At least and at most some As are 
not B”. That is, if it is true that “not all As are B”, then it is false that no As are 
B and equally false that all As are not B; there is no universal, whether affirma-
tive or negative, that is true of As and B. Brunschwig calls this the “maximal 
particular”. 
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The “maximal particular” as source of the pas-tout
J.-A. Miller holds that this maximal particular is the origin of Lacan’s 
pas-tout.16 This means, then, that ~(∀x)Φx implies not only that (∀x)Φx is 
false but also that (∀x)~Φx is as well. On consideration, it is obvious that this 
implies that the “quanteurs” are not to be taken in extension and that the 
only possible way to understand the maximal reading of “~(∀x)Φx” is as “Not 
all of x is Φ”.
Miller further claims, incorrectly I believe, that Lacan’s pas-tout differs 
from Aristotelian quantification in another respect, which is that the uni-
verse of discourse in Aristotelian logic is finite, with the consequence that, 
irrespective of whether the pas-tout is interpreted as maximal or minimal, it is 
concerned with lack and incompleteness. He adds that because the Lacanian 
pas-tout assumes an infinite universe, and because it is constructed on the 
intuitionist model of a sequence of choice, it is impossible to state the univer-
sality of the predicate. If the law by which the series, all As are B, is defined 
is not stated at the outset, it will be impossible, no matter how many As have 
been shown to be B, even without ever having found an A that is not B, to 
draw a conclusion about all. The sequence is “lawless”, which is an attribute 
of the Lacanian real.17
The claim that the universe of discourse of Aristotelian logic is finite 
while Lacan’s pas-tout assumes an infinite universe of discourse is, I believe, 
incorrect because Aristotelian logic holds of finite and infinite universes 
equally well; it makes no difference to the logical relations between the state-
ments whether they refer to a finite or an infinite number of things. It makes 
a difference if the universe is empty. But from all As are Bs, it follows that no 
As are non-B, whether there is a finite or infinite number of As.
Perhaps Miller’s point can be made in a different way, one that brings 
us back to the intuitionism / constructivism distinction. The quantifiers, “∀” 
and “∃”, make it possible to refer to an infinite number of objects, and hence 
to a totality – but on the proviso that it is possible to characterize, by way of a 
predicate, all members of the class. For instance, “(∀x)[(x>1)->(x>0)]”, that 
is, “If a number is greater than 1 then it is greater than zero”, is true of an 
infinite number of cases because the class of numbers is infinite. However, 
if there is no way to define the members of an infinitely large class, then the 
truth of the statement cannot be established. Because the class is infinitely 
16 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Notice de fil en aiguille”, in: Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire de 
Jacques Lacan, Livre XXIII, Le sinthome 1975–1976, Seuil, Paris 2005, pp. 207–8.
17Ibid., p. 208.
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large, enumeration of cases cannot exhaust them all; and because there is no 
suitable predicate they cannot be referred to as a totality. 
Again, we can see how the question of actual infinity is irrelevant to the 
issue, since the issue is merely one of the impossibility of defining a potential 
infinity (and of course the impossibility of enumerating an infinite number 
of cases).
Badiou’s criticisms of Lacan seem misplaced, then, and to my mind re-
sult from his realist views about mathematics and unnecessary reference to 
the concept of an actual infinite. 
There is one further issue that I should signal, which unfortunately I can-
not go into here. A moment’s reflection is enough to see that the reference 
to the enumeration of cases, that is, to the impossibility of doing so in the 
case of ~(∀x)Φx, implicitly means taking the formula “in extension”: not a, 
not b, not c, … In other words, there are two readings of the pas-tout which, 
one suspects, are a real source of confusion in the glosses on Lacan. How this 
impacts upon the logic of the pas-tout is another matter.
